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Nonprofit organizations often rely on donations and grants to accomplish their mission.  
This study examines whether nonprofit organizations with high CEO compensation receive less 
in donor and grantor support compared to nonprofit organizations with lower CEO 
compensation.  I find strong evidence that both donors and grantors give less to organizations 
that spend a larger percentage of total expenses on total CEO compensation.  I also find that the 
reactions of donors and grantors differ based on the type of CEO compensation.  While donors 
and grantors react to CEO base compensation, grantors also react to other CEO compensation 
and nontaxable benefits.   
In additional tests, I find strong evidence that the negative reaction of donors and grantors 
is stronger when organizations have more sophisticated donors and grantors.  I also find that the 
relation between future contributions and CEO compensation is stronger in organizations that are 
more reliant on contributions as a source of revenue.  I do not find any evidence that the 
reporting of CEO compensation expense as program related, management, or fundraising has any 
effect on how donors and grantors respond to the percentage of expenses spent on CEO 
compensation.  I also do not find that the CEO serving on the board of directors changes how 
donors and grantors respond to CEO compensation. Overall, my results suggest high 
compensation to CEOs of nonprofit organizations can have adverse consequences to an 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation can be a controversial issue for stakeholders of nonprofit 
organizations.  Many donors and grantors contend that Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
compensation is too high at some nonprofit organizations (e.g., Perry 2010, Green 2012, Charity 
Navigator 2013).  This often stems from the belief that the resources spent on high compensation 
are funneled away from activities directly related to the organization’s mission.  Others believe 
that CEOs should not be highly compensated because they work for a nonprofit organization 
(e.g., Gose 2012a, Parker 2013).  In this study, I examine whether CEO compensation affects the 
donations and grants a nonprofit receives.  If donors and grantors are sensitive to the amount of 
compensation that nonprofit organizations pay their CEOs, I predict that organizations that spend 
a higher percentage of their expenses on CEO compensation will receive less in donations and 
grants compared to nonprofit organizations that spend a lower percentage.1 Additionally, I expect 
the response to be conditional on the type of CEO compensation so I also examine whether 
donors and grantors respond to the type and amount of compensation paid to the CEO, such as 
bonuses or deferred compensation.2   
Most donors and grantors contribute funds to nonprofit organizations to provide 
resources to further the mission of the organization.  However, because of agency costs, donors 
and grantors lack confidence that the organization will use their funds for the purported mission 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, Hansmann 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983).  Top management can 
expropriate donations and grants for personal use through excessive salaries and perquisite 
                                                 
1 I examine the reaction of donors and grantors jointly and separately.  I use the level of future 
donation income to examine donor reaction and the level of future grant income to examine 
grantor reaction.  I use the level of total contributions – the combination of donations, grants, and 
indirect donations – to examine donor and grantor reaction jointly. 
2 Specifically, I examine CEO base compensation, incentive compensation, other compensation, 
deferred compensation, and nontaxable benefits.  I define these in Section 2. 
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consumption (Manne 1999, Krishnan et al. 2006).  High profile scandals reported in the media 
provide examples of how this expropriation occurs.3  Consider for example, the two founders of 
The Young Adult Institute Network, a New York nonprofit organization operated to help the 
developmentally disabled.  They each earned close to one million dollars a year, drove luxury 
automobiles financed by the organization, and had the organization pay their children’s college 
tuition and over $50,000 in living expenses for one year for one child (Buettner 2011).  This 
controversy led the governor of New York to limit the amount of state funds that can be used to 
pay nonprofit salaries (Gose 2012a).  This example shows how serious a concern the agency 
problem can be for donors and grantors and is consistent with prior research arguing that agency 
problems can be more severe in nonprofit organizations (Fama and Jensen 1983, Manne 1999).   
The primary source of disclosure about nonprofit organizations is the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Form 990.  The IRS requires most organizations that are exempt from paying 
federal income tax to file Form 990, an information return, with the IRS every year.  Donors and 
grantors have access to these returns because organizations must make them publicly available 
and GuideStar, a charity watch organization, makes them available on their website.4  In 2008, 
the IRS implemented new disclosure rules that increased and improved the reporting of 
executive compensation information on the Form 990.  The change in regulation requires 
nonprofit organizations to report details about executive compensation not previously available, 
including a breakdown of total compensation by type for each executive (Panepento and Kean 
                                                 
3 For examples of some high profile scandals involving nonprofit organizations, see Williams et 
al. (2005) (American University), Perry (2007) (The Smithsonian Institution), Frazier (2009) 
(United Way of Central Carolinas), and Buettner (2011) (The Young Adult Institute Network), 
among others.   
4 Donors and grantors can view these completed Form 990s for free at www.guidestar.org. 
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2008).  I exploit the compensation information reported on the revised Form 990 to test my 
research questions. 
It is possible that donors and grantors may not respond to CEO compensation levels.  The 
median donation by an individual per charity is small and these individuals may not feel like the 
size of their donation warrants extensive research of the nonprofit organization (Mulligan 2007).  
Additionally, some donors and grantors may feel that high CEO compensation is necessary to 
attract and retain high quality executives who are able to run large, complex nonprofit 
organizations (Perry 2010, Parker 2013).  Finally, some donors have internal motivations to give 
such as personal ties or the “warm glow” they feel from giving (Hansmann 1980, Andreoni 
1990, Gordon and Khumawala 1999).  However, given that prior studies have found that 
donations are sensitive to the disclosure of material weaknesses and governance quality 
(Petrovits et al. 2011, Harris et al. 2014), it is reasonable to expect that donors and grantors react 
to CEO compensation, a topic that receives significantly more media attention.   
To address my research questions, I construct a sample of 501(c)(3) organizations from 
2008 and 2009.5  I choose these years to take advantage of the compensation information now 
available on the revised Form 990 to test several of my hypotheses.  Since I am interested in the 
level of donations and grants made to an organization the year after the disclosure of CEO 
compensation details, for an organization to remain in my sample, it must have donation and 
grant information available for 2009 and 2010.  Additionally, future contributions, donations, 
and grants must be at least one thousand dollars.  After eliminating organizations that are not 
required to disclose detailed compensation plan information and observations with missing data, 
                                                 
5 I focus on 501(c)(3) organizations because these public charities receive tax deductible 
donations by donors.  I construct my sample using information from 2008 through 2010 Form 
990s, available on the IRS’s website. 
4 
 
the final sample contains 8,610 observations when future contributions is the dependent variable 
and 8,174 (5,182) observations for tests involving donations (grants) as the dependent variable.  
I find strong evidence that future contributions are lower for organizations that spend a 
higher percentage of total expenses on total CEO compensation.  When I examine the two major 
components of future contributions – future donations and grants – I find that both are negatively 
related to the percentage of total expenses spent on CEO compensation.  These results indicate 
that both donors and grantors are sensitive to the size of CEO compensation in relation to total 
expenses of the organization.  To better understand the implications of this result, consider two 
organizations that pay their CEOs $500,000 in total compensation.  The organization whose 
CEO compensation is 2% of total expenses would receive less in contributions than the 
organization whose CEO compensation is 1% of total expenses, all else being equal.  These 
results indicate that both donors and grantors penalize organizations with high CEO 
compensation relative to total expenses by providing lower levels of funding. 
In additional tests, I examine how donors and grantors react to the specific types of CEO 
compensation.  I decompose total CEO compensation into base compensation, incentive 
compensation, other compensation, deferred compensation, and nontaxable benefits.  Base 
compensation includes salary while incentive compensation includes bonuses and other 
contingent payments.  Other compensation includes all other taxable compensation that must be 
included on the CEO’s W-2.6  I find that future contributions are negatively related to the 
percentage of total expenses spent on CEO base compensation, other compensation, and 
                                                 
6 Examples of payments included in this category are: severance payments, tax gross-ups paid, 
vacation or sick leave cashed out, forgiveness of loan debt or interest, employee deferrals to 
401(k) or 403(b) plans, taxable housing provided by the employer, employer-provided 
automobile, and expenses paid on behalf of the executive such as personal legal services, 
personal financial services, and social club dues.  The types of CEO compensation are discussed 
in more detail in Section 2.  
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nontaxable benefits.  When I drill down to the donor level, I find that future donations are 
negatively related to the percentage of total expenses spent on CEO base compensation.  These 
results indicate that donors penalize organizations that spend a high percentage of their expenses 
on the CEO’s base compensation.  Grantors appear to be influenced by more types of CEO 
compensation than donors.  I find that future grants are negatively related to the percentage of 
expenses spent on base compensation, other compensation, and nontaxable benefits for the CEO.  
The results indicate that grantors reduce grant awards, especially in response to high levels of 
base compensation, other compensation, and nontaxable benefits. 
Given the results of my main tests, I examine several instances where the reaction of 
donors and grantors may be even stronger.  Using the presence of, and level of, restricted net 
assets to proxy for donor and grantor sophistication, I find strong evidence that the negative 
reaction of donors and grantors is stronger when organizations have more sophisticated donors 
and grantors.  I also find that the relation between future contributions and CEO compensation is 
stronger in organizations that are more reliant on contributions as a source of revenue.  I do not 
find any evidence that the reporting of CEO compensation expense as program, management, or 
fundraising has any effect on how donors and grantors respond to the percentage of expenses 
spent on CEO compensation.  I also do not find that the CEO serving on the board of directors 
changes how donors and grantors respond to CEO compensation.  
 In robustness tests, I create a measure of industry adjusted CEO compensation.  To 
control for the possibility that the percentage of expenses spent on CEO compensation is related 
to the type of nonprofit organization, I calculate the median ratio of CEO compensation scaled 
by total expenses for each nonprofit industry per year.  I subtract the industry median for each 
observation to calculate the industry adjusted CEO compensation ratio.  I find consistent results 
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for total CEO compensation – future contributions, donations, and grants are negatively related 
to industry adjusted total CEO compensation scaled by total expenses.  I also find that donors 
and grantors are sensitive to the same types of CEO compensation. 
This study has several implications for nonprofit organizations, donors, grantors, 
lawmakers, and regulators.  First, we know that many stakeholders feel that the compensation of 
nonprofit executives is high.  Charity Navigator (2013), in its most recent nonprofit CEO 
compensation study, recognized this sentiment and wrote “[w]e know that many donors continue 
to be concerned by what they believe to be excessive charity CEO pay.”  To the best of my 
knowledge, there is only one other study examining whether CEO compensation affects donor 
and grantor behavior across the broad spectrum of nonprofit organizations.7  These results should 
be of interest to boards of directors of nonprofit organizations as they weigh the potential 
consequences to an organization when setting and negotiating CEO compensation and its 
specific characteristics.   
While researchers have studied how executive compensation disclosure affects 
stakeholders of for-profit firms, we do not know how stakeholders use compensation disclosures 
in nonprofit firms.  We know from research in the for-profit literature that CEO compensation 
disclosure affects stakeholder behavior.  DeFusco et al. (1990) find that shareholders react 
positively and bondholders react negatively to the disclosure of CEO compensation that aligns 
CEO’s incentives to shareholders.  Similarly, Wei and Yermack (2011) find that shareholders 
react negatively and bondholders react positively to the disclosure of CEO compensation that 
aligns CEO’s incentives to bondholders.  My study adds to the findings of this research by 
                                                 
7 In a related study, Balsam and Harris (2014) find that donors and grantors do not react to the 
level of CEO compensation disclosed on Form 990.  Their measure of compensation is unscaled 
and they use a different model which may explain the difference in results. 
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showing that donors and grantors, important stakeholders of nonprofit firms, also react to the 
disclosure of nonprofit executive compensation. 
Most papers that examine donor and grantor reactions to expenditures in nonprofit 
organizations have focused on the reported allocation of total expenses – either total program 
related, total administrative, or total fundraising expenses (e.g. Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986, 
Posnett and Sandler 1989, Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007).  They frequently find that donations 
and grants are sensitive to the amount of expenses spent in each of these categories.  Given this 
outcome, researchers also find evidence that nonprofit organizations manipulate the reporting of 
these amounts to reflect more favorably on the organization (Krishnan et al. 2006, Tinkelman 
and Mankaney 2007).  Building on these previous studies, I go a step further and examine a 
specific type of expense that donors and grantors may be sensitive to, something previous studies 
have generally not done.  Examining CEO compensation expense has the added benefit that the 
reported amount should be relatively free of manipulation, avoiding a concern of the previous 
studies examining reported expenses.8  
In a related paper, Balsam and Harris (2014) examine how donors respond to media 
coverage of and the Form 990 disclosure of CEO compensation in nonprofit organizations.9  
They find that the percentage change in donations from t-1 to t+1 is negatively related to media 
coverage of CEO compensation in t but not related to the level of CEO compensation disclosed 
in the Form 990 in t.  They do find that the percentage change in donations is negatively related 
to the level of CEO compensation when an organization has more sophisticated donors.  My 
                                                 
8 Reporting requirements for the revised Form 990 require that the portion of the CEO’s 
compensation reported on the Form 990 that is taxable must match the Form W-2 that is filed 
with the government every year, insuring more accurate reporting on the Form 990.   
9 This is the only other paper I am aware of that examines donor reaction to CEO compensation 
across a wide range of nonprofit organization types. 
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study differs from theirs in several ways.  First, I use the level of future donations instead of 
changes in donations between two years.  This, plus other model choices, helps me achieve more 
explanatory power with a higher adjusted R2 value.  Second, I use the percentage of expenses 
spent on CEO compensation instead of an unscaled measure of CEO compensation.  This 
provides a CEO compensation amount that is more useful to donors and grantors to evaluate and 
compare against other nonprofit organizations.  Finally, in all of my tests, I examine how 
different circumstances may effect both donors and grantors, both separately and combined.   
In the next section, I review the prior literature on nonprofit donor and grantor behavior 
and develop my hypotheses.  In Section 3, I discuss my sample selection and research design.  I 
present descriptive statistics and my empirical analysis in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior Literature 
The size of the nonprofit sector is substantial.  The Urban Institute estimates that there 
were approximately 1.58 million nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS in 2011, 
representing a 21.5 percent increase in nonprofit organizations since 2001 (Pettijohn 2013).  The 
nonprofit sector has a significant impact on the overall economy of the United States (U.S.), 
contributing $836.9 billion or 5.6 percent of gross domestic product to the economy in 2011 
(Pettijohn 2013).  Charitable contributions, which are a primary interest of this study, were 
$316.23 billion in 2012 (Giving USA Foundation 2013).   
With billions in contributions given to nonprofit organizations every year, it is important 
to understand the agency problems that exist in these organizations (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Fama and Jensen 1983).  Agency problems arise because donors and grantors lack assurance that 
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top management will not expropriate their contributions for personal use (Hansmann 1980, 
Krishnan et al. 2006).  Expropriation can occur through excessive salaries and perquisite 
consumption, pursuing personal goals that are not related to the organization’s mission, and 
slacking on professional duties – all activities that consume funds that could instead be used to 
further the organization’s mission (Manne 1999, Krishnan et al. 2006).  Core et al. (2006) find 
evidence consistent with this theory.  They examine what happens in nonprofit organizations that 
hold excess cash.  They find that excess cash is negatively related to future program related 
expenditures but positively related to future CEO compensation.  Their findings suggest that 
excess cash is more likely to be spent on CEO compensation than spent on expenses that are 
directly related to furthering the organization’s mission.   
Numerous examples of the agency problem in nonprofit organizations also appear in the 
media.  Consider for example, the two founders of The Young Adult Institute Network, a 
nonprofit organization operated to help the developmentally disabled in New York.  The 
founders both earned close to one million dollars each year in compensation, drove luxury 
automobiles paid for by the organization, and had the organization pay their children’s college 
tuition and over $50,000 in living expenses for one year for one child (Buettner 2011).  This 
scandal, as well as others, highlights how executives can expropriate resources from the 
nonprofit organizations they lead for personal use.10 
Agency problems can be more severe for nonprofit organizations (Fama and Jensen 1983, 
Manne 1999).  In for-profit firms, residual claimants (common shareholders) benefit directly 
from monitoring management, which in turn reduces agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Nonprofit organizations lack residual claimants, making it unclear who fulfills the monitoring 
                                                 




role over these organizations (Core et al. 2006).11  Ultimately, the enforcement of nonprofit 
organizations resides with the IRS or state attorney generals, but their enforcement activities 
have historically been limited, often because of resource constraints (Hansmann 1980, Manne 
1999, Mulligan 2007, Strom 2011).  Donors and grantors have the incentive to provide some 
monitoring to ensure that their contributions are used to further the mission of the organization.  
However, “because monitoring costs are internalized by the monitors, and because they do not 
realize corresponding gains simply by making nonprofits more efficient…,” the incentive for 
donors and grantors to monitor nonprofit organization is greatly weakened (Manne 1999).  
Furthermore, the incentive of donors and grantors is further weakened because they have limited 
legal rights against the nonprofit organization if they feel the organization is not using donated 
funds appropriately (Hansmann 1980, Manne 1999).   
Since monitoring is so costly, donors and grantors have the incentive to view the prior 
operating performance of the organization and its governance structure and policies before they 
make funding decisions.  While this may not guarantee that their funds will be used 
appropriately, past behavior may be an indication of how the organization will operate and use 
its resources in the future.  Numerous empirical studies document that donors do respond to an 
organization’s past behavior before deciding to donate (e.g., Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986, 
Posnett and Sandler 1989, Petrovits et al. 2011, Harris et al. 2014).  One of the most common 
performance indicators that donors and grantors use is the program expense ratio – the 
percentage of total expenses that an organization spends on activities related to its mission.  
Research finds that organizations with higher program service ratios receive more in donations 
                                                 
11 By definition, nonprofit organizations are distinguished from for-profit organizations in that 
they are prohibited from paying out profits to any individual who has control over the 
organization (i.e. they have no residual claimants) (Hansmann 1980).   
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and grants (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986, Posnett and Sandler 1989, Buchheit and Parsons 
2006, Harris et al. 2014).  Similarly, organizations with a high administrative expense ratio – the 
percentage of total expenses that an organization spends on running the organization and 
overhead – have lower donations (Greenlee and Brown 1999, Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007).12  
Both of these measures attempt to capture the efficiency in which an organization uses its 
resources and charity watchdog organizations often use these measures to rate nonprofit 
organizations.13 To the extent that CEO compensation represents a large portion of total expense 
for the organization, donors and grantors may interpret it as evidence of low organizational 
efficiency and high agency costs. 
Researchers have confirmed that donors and grantors also consider other characteristics 
of organizations before they decide to contribute or grant funds to an organization.  Harris et al. 
(2014) find that both donations and grants are higher for organizations with better overall 
governance.14  Kitching (2009) finds that donations are higher for organizations with higher 
quality auditors and that donors are more sensitive to high quality accounting information.  Other 
researchers have also examined how donors respond to the quality of information reported by an 
organization.  Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) find that donors have a more negative reaction 
to the administrative expense ratio when administrative expenses are more likely to be accurate.  
                                                 
12 Because donors respond to these ratios, organizations have incentives to manipulate the 
reported numbers.  Consistent with this motivation, Krishnan et al. (2006) find evidence 
organizations report manipulated numbers.  However, the likelihood of inappropriate reporting 
can be reduced by the use of an outside accountant (Krishnan et al. 2006, Keating et al. 2008) 
and through better overall governance (Yetman and Yetman 2012).   
13 Examples of how two watchdog organizations use the program service ratio to evaluate 
nonprofit organizations can be found on the Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving Alliance 
website (http://www.bbb.org/us/standards-for-charity-accountability/) and Charity Navigator’s 
website (http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=35).   




Similarly, Yetman and Yetman (2013) find that donors respond less favorably to high program 
service ratios when there is evidence that these program service ratios are inflated.  Donors and 
grantors reduce their funding to organizations that have weak internal controls over financial 
reporting that can lead to lower information quality (Petrovits et al. 2011).   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that lawmakers, donors, and grantors are deeply interested 
in understanding the implications of nonprofit CEO compensation (e.g., Spector 2009, Wilhelm 
and Williams 2009, Perry 2010, Gose 2012a).  Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives 
proposed legislation that would monetarily penalize nonprofit organizations that pay any 
employee over one million dollars in compensation (Daniels 2014).  Similarly, many states have 
passed or proposed laws limiting the amount of compensation nonprofit executives can earn if 
the nonprofit receives state funds (Gose 2012a).  Intense scrutiny by Congress and the media has 
led some boards to change how they compensate their executives and has caused some 
executives to forego collecting compensation which had already been awarded (Perry 2010, 
Gose 2012b).  Some lawmakers question the need of grants or additional funding for 
organizations that can afford to pay their executives half-million dollar or higher salaries 
(DeMint 2011).  These examples highlight the concern that many nonprofit stakeholders have 
regarding nonprofit CEO compensation and the steps taken by some stakeholders to limit CEO 
compensation in nonprofit organizations. 
CEO Compensation  
We know that for many stakeholders, high CEO compensation in nonprofit organizations 
is a concern.  When donors and grantors observe that nonprofit organizations spend a high 
percentage of expenses on CEO compensation, this may indicate increased agency problems 
within the organization.  Given the potential agency costs related to high compensation and the 
13 
 
desire for donors and grantors to have their funding used to further the mission of the 
organization, I predict that donors and grantors will penalize those organizations with the highest 
CEO compensation.  Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative form:   
H1:  Nonprofit organizations that spend a higher percentage of their expenses on CEO 
compensation will receive less in contributions compared to nonprofit organizations that 
spend less.   
 
Types of CEO Compensation 
It is possible that donor and grantor reactions are conditional on the type of compensation 
the CEO receives.  Total CEO compensation is comprised of base compensation, incentive 
compensation, other reportable compensation, deferred benefits, and nontaxable compensation. 
The Form 990 instructions detail how nonprofit organizations should report CEO compensation 
under each of these types of compensation (IRS 2008b).  Base compensation is the yearly salary 
of the CEO, while incentive compensation includes signing bonuses or bonuses and payments 
made for reaching set targets.  Other reportable compensation includes severance payments, tax 
gross-ups paid, vacation or sick leave cashed out, forgiveness of loan debt or interest, employee 
deferrals to 401(k) or 403(b) plans, taxable housing payments, employer-provided automobile, 
and expenses paid on behalf of the executive such as personal legal services, personal financial 
services, and social club dues.  Deferred compensation includes deferrals made to a retirement or 
deferred compensation plan.  Nontaxable benefits are the benefits a CEO receives that are not 
taxable under the Internal Revenue Code, such as health insurance, life insurance, and dependent 
care assistance. 
Donors may react strongly to higher levels of incentive compensation if they feel like 
nonprofit organizations use ineffective bonus structures that do not reward the right behavior or 
if they feel like nonprofit organizations should not use bonuses at all to compensate CEOs 
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(Hancock 2013).  Donors may respond negatively to high levels of other compensation – a 
component that includes many different types of compensation including taxable perquisites 
(some types seen as more excessive) – as high amounts in this category may mean less 
transparency and higher agency costs.  Yermack (2006) finds that shareholders of for-profit firms 
react negatively to the disclosure of specific perquisites for the CEO.  Because of the possibility 
of different reactions to different types of CEO compensation, I also test how donors and 
grantors react to each type of compensation.  Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative 
form: 
H2:  Donors and grantors react negatively to higher amounts of different types of CEO 
compensation compared to lower amounts of the same type of CEO compensation. 
 
Donor and Grantor Sophistication 
 In for-profit firms, sophisticated investors provide an important role in mitigating agency 
costs related to executive compensation.  Both Core et al. (1999) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
find that CEO compensation is negatively related to measures of investor sophistication.15  While 
nonprofits do not have owners, they can have sophisticated donors and grantors.  Yetman and 
Yetman (2013) define sophisticated donors are those that have both the incentive to spend the 
resources to evaluate the nonprofit and the ability to do so.  These are donors and grantors with 
larger contributions that are more likely to exert more effort evaluating a nonprofit before they 
decide to donate (Tinkelman 1998, Gordon and Khumawala 1999).  Yetman and Yetman (2013) 
find evidence of this monitoring when they find that donations are lower in organizations with 
poor accounting quality when organizations have sophisticated donors.   
                                                 
15 Core et al. (1999) find that the presence of a blockholder having at least 5% ownership in the 
firm reduces CEO compensation.  Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that CEO compensation is 
negatively related to the level of institutional ownership of a firm.   
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 If donors and grantors give less to organizations that spend a higher percentage of 
expenses on CEO compensation, I expect them to give even less when they have the incentive to 
evaluate the nonprofit more closely.  Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative form: 
H3: When sophisticated donors and grantors are present, nonprofit organizations that 
spend a higher percentage of their expenses on CEO compensation will receive even less 
in contributions compared to nonprofit organizations that spend less. 
 
Similar to Yetman and Yetman (2013), I use the presence of restricted net assets as a proxy for 
donor and grantor sophistication.  Donations and grants with restrictions placed on them indicate 
larger contributions and more monitoring and attention paid by donors and grantors.   
CEO on the Board 
 Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that independent boards are more important in nonprofit 
organizations because nonprofits lack the takeover threat and monitoring by residual claimants 
that exist in for-profit firms.  In both for-profit and nonprofit firms, it is common for the CEO to 
serve on the board of directors, reducing board independence.  While the CEO may bring 
invaluable insight and knowledge in this role, the CEO serving on the board can increase agency 
costs (Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen 1993, Brickley et al. 2010).  In for-profit firms, researchers 
find evidence of this in higher compensation and increased entrenchment when the CEO serves 
as chairman of the board of directors (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Cyert et al. 2002, Goyal and Park 
2002, Grinstein and Hribar 2004).  There has been limited research on CEO board membership 
and agency problems in nonprofit firms likely due to data limitations.  One study that overcomes 
this limitation uses a unique sample of nonprofit hospitals and finds that CEOs that are a voting 
member of the board have higher compensation than other CEOs (Brickley et al. 2010).  When 
the CEO serves on the board of directors and the organization spends a higher percentage of its 
expenses on CEO compensation, donors and grantors may perceive this as increased agency 
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problems within the organization and decide to not give or give less to the organization.  
Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative form: 
H4: When the CEO is on the board of directors, nonprofit organizations that spend a 
higher percentage of their expenses on CEO compensation will receive even less in 
contributions compared to nonprofit organizations that spend less.   
 
Source of Revenue 
 Some nonprofit organizations earn the majority of their revenue by providing services.  
To sustain or grow the revenue in these organizations, the nonprofit needs to provide valuable 
program services.  The recipients of these services may not be concerned about agency costs in 
the organization as long as they feel they are getting value for their fees paid.  Other nonprofit 
organizations are more reliant on donations and grants to fulfill their charitable mission.  Since 
donors and grantors are not generally recipients of the program services, they are not able to 
directly evaluate the value of those programs.  Instead they have to rely on the information the 
nonprofit organization provides about the organization and its activities (Gordon and 
Khumawala 1999).  If they review this information and find evidence of agency problems in the 
organization, they may choose not to give or to give less to the organization.  If donors and 
grantors give less to organizations that spend a higher percentage of expenses on CEO 
compensation, I expect this relation to be higher in organizations that are more dependent on 
donations and grants.  Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative:  
H5:  When more reliant on contributions, nonprofit organizations that spend a higher 
percentage of their expenses on CEO compensation will receive even less in 
contributions compared to nonprofit organizations that spend less. 
 
An organization that is reliant on contributions as a source of revenue may be more grant 
revenue dependent or it may be more donation dependent.  It is possible that the source of 
contribution revenue may have an effect on the level of monitoring and evaluation of the 
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organization and hence how the CEO’s compensation is viewed.  Nonprofit organizations that 
receive grants often have to submit a proposal along with the Form 990 and other supplemental 
information which may lead to more evaluation and monitoring of the organization (Mulligan 
2007).  However, there is some evidence that grantors may not actually evaluate and use the 
information that is provided to them (Gronbjerg 1991, Froelich 1999).  Nonprofit organizations 
that are reliant on donations as a source of revenue may or may not be evaluated thoroughly by 
donors.  Many donations are small and donors may lack the motivation or incentive to research 
the nonprofit organizations (Mulligan 2007).  Still, when organizations are dependent on 
contributions and donations are a major source of those contributions, donations are more likely 
to be large in size, which can motivate donors to incur the research costs needed to evaluate the 
organization.  Therefore, it is an empirical question whether the relation between total future 
contributions and CEO compensation is affected by whether the organization is more dependent 
on grant or donation revenue.  Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative: 
H6: Organizations with more grant revenue than donation revenue react to the percentage 
of expenses spent on CEO compensation differently than organizations with more 
donation revenue than grant revenue. 
 
CEO Salary Allocation 
 Traditionally, the program service ratio has been used by stakeholders to evaluate the 
efficiency and performance of nonprofit organizations.  Generally, the greater the amount of total 
expenses spent on program related activities, the better stakeholders view the firm because those 
expenses are furthering the mission of the organization.  As part of their expense reporting, 
nonprofit organizations report the amount of officer compensation that is related to program 
related activities, management activities, and fundraising activities.  Donors and grantors that are 
sensitive to a higher percentage of expenses spent on CEO compensation may be less so if some 
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of the CEO’s compensation relates to time spent on program related activities.  Stated another 
way, any negative relation between future funding and CEO compensation may be more negative 
when all CEO compensation is considered overhead (i.e. allocated to management and 
fundraising).  Specifically, I hypothesize, stated in the alternative: 
H7:  When the CEO’s entire compensation is spent on management and fundraising 
activities, nonprofit organizations that spend a higher percentage of their expenses on 
CEO compensation will receive even less in contributions compared to nonprofit 
organization that spend less. 
 
Form 990 
 One of the primary ways that nonprofit organizations disclose information about their 
organizations is through the IRS Form 990.  Form 990 is an informational tax return that many 
nonprofit organizations must file every year with the IRS.16  The Form 990 reports information 
about the organization’s activities, finances, compensation, and governance for the year.  Unlike 
other tax returns filed with the IRS, nonprofit organizations must make their completed Form 
990 available for public inspection.  GuideStar, a charity watchdog organization, makes all 
nonprofit organizations’ Form 990s available on its website.   
In 2008, the IRS made significant changes in nonprofit disclosure regulations and 
completed a major overhaul of the Form 990 with the goals of “enhancing transparency, 
promoting tax compliance, and minimizing burden on the filing organization” (IRS 2008a).  The 
reporting of executive compensation on the Form 990 was one of the areas that underwent major 
changes.17   
                                                 
16 There are some organizations that are exempt from filing the Form 990.  These include, but are 
not limited to, many small nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, and certain 
organizations related to the government.  While these organizations may be exempt from filing 
the Form 990, they may have other, less detailed filing requirements with the IRS (IRS 2008b).  
17 One of the problems for donors and grantors interested in executive compensation is that they 
have historically not had much access to detailed, accurate information about executive 
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The revised Form 990 includes a separate Schedule J that organizations must complete if 
they have any executives earning over $150,000 in total compensation.  On Schedule J, 
organizations answer questions about specific types of fringe benefits executives receive and 
policies regarding reimbursement of those expenses. 18 Organizations also disclose their process 
for establishing the CEO’s compensation.  Specifically, organizations must disclose if they used 
1) a compensation committee, 2) an independent compensation consultant, 3) the Form 990 of 
other organizations, 4) a written employment contract, 5) a compensation survey or study, and 6) 
approval by the board or compensation committee when establishing the CEO’s compensation.  
While none of these are specifically required, these actions can help establish that the CEO’s 
compensation is reasonable (IRS 2008b).  Organizations also must disclose whether any listed 
executive received severance payments or compensation contingent on the revenue or net 
earnings of the organization or related organization.   
On Part 2 of Schedule J, organizations now provide a detailed breakdown of executive 
compensation.  For each listed executive, organizations report their base compensation, bonus 
and incentive compensation, other reportable compensation, deferred compensation, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
compensation.  Prior to 2008, organizations completing Form 990 were required to report some 
compensation related information about current officers, directors, trustees, and key employees 
but they frequently provided incorrect or incomplete information (Strom 2007).  In 2004, the IRS 
began an executive compensation compliance project and reported the results in 2007 (IRS 
2007).  The IRS found significant reporting issues related to executive compensation, resulting in 
over 30 percent of nonprofits involved in the project filing amended Form 990s and 15 percent to 
be selected for IRS examinations.  The IRS found “significant reporting errors and omissions” 
related to compensation reporting and found that organizations were confused by the Form 990 
instructions.   
18 Specifically, the fringe benefit categories listed on Schedule J are: 1) first-class or charter 
travel, 2) travel for companions, 3) tax indemnification and gross-up payments, 4) discretionary 
spending account, 5) housing allowance or residence for personal use, 6) payments for business 





nontaxable benefits.19  The instructions for the revised Form 990 include much more detail and a 
table showing how to report almost 70 different types of compensation an executive may receive.  
All organizations must now report this compensation on a calendar year basis.  I use the 
information disclosed in Schedule J and elsewhere on the revised Form 990 to test my 
hypotheses.  A copy of Schedule J is included in Appendix A for reference. 
 
3.  SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample and Data Sources 
 To construct my sample, I access Form 990 data from the microdata files on the IRS’s 
Statistics of Income Tax Stats website.20  Because several of my hypotheses can only be 
answered with information disclosed on the revised Form 990, my sample begins with all 
501(c)(3) organizations reported in the database for 2008 and 2009 (29,767 initial observations).  
I eliminate 11,219 organizations that do not file Schedule J, the source detailed compensation 
information including the amount of the different types of compensation.21   
                                                 
19 The sum of base compensation, bonus and incentive compensation, and other reportable 
compensation must equal the amounts reported on the executive’s Form W-2 or 1099 for the 
year.  This should improve the accuracy of the compensation reported, as well as help the IRS 
enforce compliance with Form 990 reporting. 
20 The data is available at the following website: http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-
Charities-and-Other-Tax-Exempt-Organizations-Statistics.  The IRS database does not contain 
Form 990 information for every nonprofit but is instead a size-weighted sample of 501(c)(3)-
501(c)(9) organizations.  Per the IRS website “[s]ampling rates ranged from 1 percent for small-
asset classes to 100 percent for large-asset classes.”  I use both the Form 990 Main Data File and 
the Form 990 Compensation Date File for my analysis. 
21 One potential limitation of this study is that it uses information that organizations disclose on 
Schedule J.  Organizations generally must file Schedule J if they have any executive paid over 
$150,000.  Because of this, the findings in this study may not be generalizable to smaller 
organizations with executives paid less than the $150,000 threshold.  However, it is possible that 
these smaller organizations are less likely to get large donations and grants so donors and 
grantors have a lower incentive to process the information available in the Form 990.   
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 The IRS 990 Compensation Data File includes a record of all individuals listed in the 
Form 990 that receive compensation from the organization during the year.  However, it does not 
identify any of these records with individual names or titles.  Following methodology similar to 
Sedatole et al. (2013), I assume that the highest compensated officer of the organization is the 
CEO.22  Additionally, to avoid labeling the wrong individual as CEO when a related organization 
may pay all or part of the CEO’s compensation, I eliminate organizations that have any officer 
compensated by a related organization.  Because of these limitations, I cannot reasonably 
determine the CEO for 8,199 organizations.  I lose 17 observations where no compensation is 
reported for the CEO or one of the types of CEO compensation is negative and 175 observations 
for missing control variables.  I eliminate 1,547 observations from the total contributions sample 
because I am unable to determine the level of contributions in t+1 or contributions in t+1 are less 
than one thousand dollars.  My final sample to test the combined reaction of donors and grantors 
consists of 8,610 observations.  For tests related to donor (grantor) behavior, I eliminate 1,983 
(4,975) observation where I cannot determine the level of donations (grants) in t+1 or donations 
(grants) are less than one thousand dollars.  The final sample for donation (grant) level tests 
consists of 8,174 (5,182) observations.  Panel A in Table 1 provides a summary of my sample 
selection.  
Panel B in Table 1 provides the sample distribution by National Taxonomy of Exempt 
Entities (NTEE) category (or industry).23  For all three samples, the distribution of observations 
across NTEE categories is roughly equal.  Approximately one-third of each sample consists of 
                                                 
22 Organizations indicate the position of each individual listed on Form 990 in Part VII, box (C).  
Per the Form 990 instructions, organizations should mark the “top management official” of an 
organization as an “officer” of the organization. 
23 The IRS and other entities use NTEE codes to classify nonprofit organizations.  More 
information on NTEE codes can be found at http://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm.   
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education-related nonprofit organizations.  Another one-third of observations are from nonprofit 
organizations engaged in health-related activities.  The remaining portion of each sample is 
mostly comprised of organizations with a human service, a public or societal benefit, or an arts 
and culture mission.  In all of the models used to test my hypotheses, I include industry fixed 
effects. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
CEO Compensation 
 H1 states that nonprofit organizations that spend a higher percentage of expenses on CEO 
compensation will receive less in contributions compared to nonprofit organizations that spend a 
lower percentage of expenses on CEO compensation.  To test this hypothesis, I estimate the 
following ordinary least square (OLS) model, based on the donation demand model developed 
by Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986): 
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = α1 + α2CEOTotalComp/TEi + α3ProgramExpRatioi  
+ α4LnFundraisingExpi + α5LnAgei + α6LnTotalAssetsi + α7LnGovtGrantsi  
+ α8LnProgramServRevi + α9LnFederatedCampaignsi + α10LnDonationsi  
+ αdIndustryDummiesi + ε.       (1) 
 
I use the level of future contributions (LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable to 
test how all donors and grantors together respond to disclosed CEO compensation information.  
Contributions include amounts received in direct donations, indirect donations (discussed in 
more detail in the additional tests subsection), and grants.  To test donor and grantor reaction 
separately, I replace future total contributions with its largest components.  To test how donors 
respond to disclosed CEO compensation information, I use future donations 
(LnFutureDonations) as the dependent variable.  Alternatively, to test how grantors respond to 
disclosed CEO compensation information, I use future grants (LnFutureGovtGrants) as the 
dependent variable.  I use the natural log of all three variables to account for the skewness in the 
23 
 
data.  All dependent variables are measured in t+1 to capture how donors and grantors respond 
to the information disclosed in t. 
 The independent variable of interest is the amount of CEO compensation.  For my main 
test, I use total CEO compensation scaled by total expenses as my variable of interest.  This ratio 
gives the percentage of expenses that an organization spends on total CEO compensation.  Using 
this measure, as opposed to the level of CEO compensation, gives context to the size of the 
CEO’s compensation relative to the other expenses of the organization.  This measure is more 
informative to donors and grantors than just the size of CEO compensation alone.  If donors and 
grantors punish organizations with high levels of CEO compensation, I expect α2 to be negative 
and significant.   
 I control for the program service ratio, ProgramExpRatio, expecting α3 to be positive and 
significant.  Numerous empirical studies have shown that as the percentage of expenses spent on 
program related expenses increases, donors and grantors respond with higher contributions (e.g., 
Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986, Posnett and Sandler 1989, Buchheit and Parsons 2006, Harris et 
al. 2014).24  I control for the amount an organization spends on fundraising costs, 
LnFundraisingExp, as prior studies show that donations increase in response to fundraising 
efforts by the organization (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986).  I control for organization age, 
LnAge, without a directional prediction.  On one hand, there may be less risk of agency costs to 
donors and grantors to give to older, more established organizations.  On the other hand, young 
nonprofit organizations just starting out may be more heavily dependent on donations and grants 
to get their activities started.  I control for organization size, LnTotalAssets, expecting larger 
organizations to receive more donations and grants (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986).  Previous 
                                                 
24 Many of these studies use the inverse of the program expense ratio.  I follow Harris et al. 
(2014) and use the program expense ratio directly for ease of interpretation.   
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studies suggest that other sources of revenue may affect future donations and grants.  Some 
studies suggest a crowding out effect – that donors and grantors will feel that the organization 
does not need additional funds if its needs are being met through other revenue sources (Posnett 
and Sandler 1989).  Other studies suggest a crowding in effect – that donors and grantors will see 
that the organization is doing well in collecting other revenue and monitoring costs will be 
shared (Okten and Weisbrod 2000).  For both dependent variables, I control for the major 
sources of revenue – government grants (LnGovtGrants), program service revenue 
(LnProgramServRev), federated campaign contributions (LnFederatedCampaigns), and general 
donations (LnDonations) received in year t (Petrovits et al. 2011).25  Detailed variable definitions 
appear in Appendix B.  For this model and all others in this study, I cluster observations by 
organization and calculate standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Types of CEO Compensation 
 I also hypothesize that donors and grantors may respond differently to the different types 
of CEO compensation (H2).  To test this hypothesis, I modify Equation 1 to include each type of 
CEO compensation and estimate the following OLS model: 
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = β1 + β2CEOBaseComp/TEi + β3CEOIncentiveComp/TEi  
+ β4CEOOtherComp/TEi + β5CEODeferredComp/TEi  
+ β6CEONontaxableBenefits/TEi + β7ProgramExpRatioi + β8LnFundraisingExpi  
+ β9LnAgei + β10LnTotalAssetsi + β11LnGovtGrantsi + β12LnProgramServRevi  
+ β13LnFederatedCampaignsi + β14LnDonationsi + βdIndustryDummiesi + ε.     (2) 
 
                                                 
25 Program service revenue is revenue earned by the organization while carrying out its exempt 
purpose.  Federated campaign contributions are indirect public contributions that come from 
federated fundraising agencies (e.g., the United Way).  Federated fundraising agencies are 
fundraising organizations that conduct fundraising campaigns and “allocate part of the net 
proceeds to each participating organization on the basis of the donors’ individual designations 
and other factors” (IRS 2008b).  In additional tests, I also test to see if federated campaign 
contributions are sensitive to CEO compensation. 
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I include the five types of CEO compensation reported on Form 990 scaled by total expenses – 
CEO base compensation (CEOBaseComp/TE), CEO incentive compensation 
(CEOIncentiveComp/TE), other CEO compensation (CEOOtherComp/TE), CEO deferred 
compensation (CEODeferredComp/TE), and CEO nontaxable benefits 
(CEONontaxableBenefits/TE).  These variables allow me to test whether donors and grantors are 
sensitive to CEO compensation types in relation to total organization expenses.  If donors and 
grantors respond negatively to large amounts of a specific type of CEO compensation, I expect 
that type’s coefficient to be negative and significant.  All control variables are the same as 
Equation 1 with the same directional predictions.  Appendix B provides detailed variable 
definitions. 
Donor and Grantor Sophistication 
 H3 states that when organizations have sophisticated donors and grantors, the negative 
relation between contributions and CEO compensation will be even stronger (i.e. more negative).  
Following Yetman and Yetman (2013), I use the presence of restricted net assets as a proxy for 
donor and grantor sophistication.  Nonprofit organizations that have restricted net assets or 
higher levels of restricted net assets are more likely to have donors and grantors that are 
providing closer monitoring and oversight that may be more likely to pay attention to the 
compensation information disclosed by the organization.  I test this hypothesis by modifying 
Equation 1 to include an interaction. 
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = γ1 + γ2CEOTotalComp/TEi + γ3HaveRestrictedNAi  
+ γ4CEOTotalComp/TEi*HaveRestrictedNAi + γ5ProgramExpRatioi  
+ γ6LnFundraisingExpi + γ7LnAgei + γ8LnTotalAssetsi + γ9LnGovtGrantsi  
+ γ10LnProgramServRevi + γ11LnFederatedCampaignsi + γ12LnDonationsi  




I interact CEO compensation with a dummy variable equal to one if the nonprofit organization 
has restricted net assets (HaveRestrictedNA).  I also use another measure of donor sophistication, 
whether the organization has restricted net assets over the median (RestirctedNAOverMed), to 
test H3, and replace HaveRestrictedNA in the model.  If more sophisticated donors and grantors 
react more negatively to CEO compensation, I expect γ4 to be negative and significant.  All 
control variables are the same as Equation 1 with the same directional predictions.  Appendix B 
provides detailed variable definitions. 
CEO on the Board 
 H4 states that when the CEO serves on the board of directors in a nonprofit organization, 
the negative relation between contributions and CEO compensation will be even stronger.  When 
the CEO serves on the board and has high compensation, donors and grantors may observe this 
as a sign of increased agency problems in the organization.  To test this hypothesis, I modify 
Equation 1 to include an interaction.   
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = δ1 + δ2CEOTotalComp/TEi + δ3CEOIsDirectori  
+ δ4CEOTotalComp/TEi*CEOIsDirectori + δ5ProgramExpRatioi  
+ δ6LnFundraisingExpi + δ7LnAgei + δ8LnTotalAssetsi + δ9LnGovtGrantsi  
+ δ10LnProgramServRevi + δ11LnFederatedCampaignsi + δ12LnDonationsi  
+ δdIndustryDummiesi + ε.       (4) 
 
I create a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is on the board of directors (CEOIsDirector).  
I obtain this information from the revised Form 990, where nonprofit organizations disclose 
whether their officers are also directors.  I interact CEOIsDirector with scaled CEO 
compensation expense.  If donors and grantors react more strongly to CEO compensation when 
the CEO serves on the board, I expect δ4 to be negative and significant.  All control variables are 




Source of Revenue 
 H5 states that when organizations are more reliant on contributions as a source of 
revenue, the negative relation between contributions and CEO compensation will be even 
stronger.  Donors and grantors are not generally the direct recipients of the program services 
provided by the organization so they have to rely on disclosed information to evaluate the 
organization and high CEO compensation may signal greater agency problems within the 
organization.  To test this hypothesis, I modify Equation 1 to include an interaction.   
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = φ1 + φ2CEOTotalComp/TEi + φ3Contri>25%i  
+ φ4CEOTotalComp/TEi*Contri>25%i + φ5ProgramExpRatioi  
+ φ6LnFundraisingExpi + φ7LnAgei + φ8LnTotalAssetsi + φ9LnGovtGrantsi  
+ φ10LnProgramServRevi + φ11LnFederatedCampaignsi + φ12LnDonationsi  
+ φdIndustryDummiesi + ε.       (5) 
 
To determine how reliant an organization is on donations and grants, I sum the total donations, 
grants, and program service revenue the organization receives.26  I then calculate what 
percentage of this revenue comes from donations and grants.  I create a dummy variable equal to 
one if this ratio is greater than 25% (Contri>25%).  I create similar dummy variables if this ratio 
is greater than 50% (Contri>50%) or greater than 75% (Contri>75%).  I interact Contri>25% 
with scaled CEO compensation expense.  If the relation between future donations and grants and 
CEO compensation is more negative when the organization is more reliant on donations and 
grants, I expect φ4 to be negative and significant.  In further tests, I replace Contri>25% with 
Contri>50% and Contri>75% and rerun the model to test the relation for organizations that are 
more dependent on donations and grants.  All control variables are the same as Equation 1 with 
the same directional predictions.  Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions. 
                                                 
26 For my purposes, I do not use total revenue as the denominator.  During my sample period, 
several organizations had significant investment losses, making their total revenue negative and 
making any percentage of total revenue hard to interpret.   
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 H6 states that the relation between contributions and CEO compensation may be affected 
by whether the organization is more dependent on grant revenue over donations.  The incentive 
to evaluate the organization may differ between these two contribution sources.  To test this 
hypothesis, I modify Equation 1 to include an interaction.   
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = λ1 + λ2CEOTotalComp/TEi + λ3Grants>Donationsi  
+ λ4CEOTotalComp/TEi*Grants>Donationsi + λ5ProgramExpRatioi  
+ λ6LnFundraisingExpi + λ7LnAgei + λ8LnTotalAssetsi + λ9LnGovtGrantsi  
+ λ10LnProgramServRevi + λ11LnFederatedCampaignsi + λ12LnDonationsi  
+ λdIndustryDummiesi + ε.       (6) 
Grants>Donations is a dummy variable equal to one if grants exceed donations in time t.  If the 
source of contribution revenue has an effect on the relation between future contributions and 
CEO compensation, I expect λ4 to be significant.  All control variables are the same as Equation 
1 with the same directional predictions.  Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions. 
CEO Salary Allocation 
 H7 states that when none of the CEO’s compensation is allocated to program related 
activities, the negative relation between contributions and CEO compensation will be even 
stronger.  Expenses spent on program related activities are generally viewed by stakeholders of 
the nonprofit as more efficient use of organization funds than high expenses spent on 
management or fundraising.  To test this hypothesis, I modify Equation 1 to include an 
interaction.   
LnFutureTotalContributionsi = ψ1 + ψ2CEOTotalComp/TEi  
+ ψ3OfficerCompAllM&Fi + ψ4CEOTotalComp/TEi*OfficerCompAllM&Fi 
+ ψ5ProgramExpRatioi + ψ6LnFundraisingExpi + ψ7LnAgei + ψ8LnTotalAssetsi  
+ ψ9LnGovtGrantsi + ψ10LnProgramServRevi + ψ11LnFederatedCampaignsi  
+ ψ12LnDonationsi + ψdIndustryDummiesi + ε.    (7) 
It is not possible from Form 990 disclosures to tell exactly how CEO compensation is allocated 
on the Statement of Functional Expenses (Part IX) in all cases.  Instead, nonprofit organizations 
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disclose the allocation of total officer compensation in which CEO compensation is included.  
However, when an organization allocates all officer compensation to management or 
fundraising, stakeholders can observe that all of the CEO’s compensation is allocated to 
management or fundraising as well and that none is allocated to program related expenses.  I 
create a dummy variable equal to one when this is the case and interact it with scaled CEO 
compensation expense.  If donors and grantors react more strongly to the amount of expenses 
spent on CEO compensation when it is all allocated to management or fundraising expenses, I 
expect ψ4 to be negative and significant.  All control variables are the same as Equation 1 with 
the same directional predictions.  Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample.  Although I use the log of many 
variables for my tests, I report the unlogged values for easier interpretation.  Additionally, 
although I use CEO compensation scaled by total expenses for my tests, I report the level of 
CEO compensation for informational purposes.  The mean (median) of future total contributions 
is $18,371,291 ($3,828,687).  Examining the two major components of total contributions, the 
mean (median) of future donations is $10,318,240 ($2,250,526) and the mean (median) of future 
grants is $11,600,569 ($1,287,967).  The mean (median) of CEO total compensation is $422,242 
($303,972).  The standard deviation of CEO total compensation is $373,953, indicating that CEO 
compensation in the sample varies considerably.  When total CEO compensation is scaled by 
total expenses, the mean (median) total CEO compensation is 1.55% (.84%) of total expenses.  
When examining the types of CEO compensation, the average CEO earns a base salary of 
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$287,467.  The mean amount of incentive compensation is $32,680 but a majority of the CEOs 
in the sample do not receive any incentive compensation.  The mean amount of other 
compensation is $37,023 while the average CEO receives $34,321 in deferred compensation and 
$19,910 in nontaxable benefits.  Nonprofit organizations in my sample spend 82.37% of 
expenses on program related expenses on average.  Approximately 34% of the observations have 
CEOs that serve on the board of directors.  The average log of total assets is 18.2431 which 
equates to approximately $213 million in assets.  The smallest observation in my sample has just 
over $1.25 million in assets (not tabulated).  Because my sample excludes small nonprofit 
organizations and organizations that are required to file Schedule J, my results are applicable 
only to larger nonprofit organizations. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Schedule J Descriptives 
 Because the information disclosed on Schedule J is new to most nonprofit stakeholders, I 
provide some descriptive statistics based on my sample in Table 3.  Not surprisingly, almost all 
of my observations provide their CEO a base salary (99.8%).  Approximately one-third of my 
observations (34.1%) provide incentive compensation to their CEO.  Approximately half receive 
other compensation (51.2%).  Over two-thirds of the CEOs receive deferred compensation 
(70.8%) and almost ninety percent receive some nontaxable benefits (88.5%).   
 Organizations also report what method(s) they use to establish the compensation of the 
CEO.  Almost all require approval of the board of directors or the compensation committee 
(91.9%).  The majority of observations use a compensation survey or study (75.9%), 
compensation committee (64.1%), and/or a written employment contract (52.9%).  The use of a 
compensation consultant (37.7%) or Form 990 of a related organization (31.7%) is not common.  
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On average, 3.5 methods are used when establishing the CEO’s compensation with a majority of 
observations using four methods.  Interestingly, a few observations (3.9%) use none of the 
reported methods to establish the CEO’s compensation while 8.7% use all six methods.   
 Finally, as incentive compensation is used in some of my tests, I report the statistics for 
the use of non-fixed, contingent compensation.  3.9% of observations report awarding 
compensation to top employees based on the revenue earned by the organization or a related 
organization.  A few more observations (4.9%) award compensation contingent on the net 
earnings of the organization or related organization.  Finally, 10.3% of observations report using 
some other type of non-fixed payment.  All of this information was previously unavailable to 
stakeholders before the revision of the Form 990. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 Correlations 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent 
variables of interest.  All independent variables are negatively correlated with the log of future 
total contributions (LnFutureTotalContributions), log of future donations (LnFutureDonations), 
and the log of future grants (LnFutureGrants).  These results are consistent with H1 and H2.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
CEO Compensation 
 H1 predicts that nonprofit organizations that spend a higher percentage of expenses on 
CEO compensation will have less in contributions compared to nonprofit organizations that 
spend less.  Table 5 presents the results from regressing the log of future contributions, the log of 
future donations, and the log of future grants on total CEO compensation and control variables.  
Column 1 reports the results when using the log of future total contributions 
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(LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on CEOTotalComp/TE 
is negative and highly significant, suggesting that future contributions are lower for nonprofit 
organizations that spend a greater percentage of their total expenses on CEO compensation.  This 
result provides support for H1.   
The control variables included in Equation 1 are all significant in explaining future 
contributions.  Consistent with predictions, future contributions are positively related to the 
amount of expenses spend on program related activities, the amount spent on fundraising efforts, 
the size of the organization, and prior donations.  Future contributions are also positively related 
to prior government grants and indirect contributions from federated campaigns.  In contrast, 
future contributions are negatively related to the age of the organization and the amount it 
receives in program service revenue.   
Examining the largest components of future contributions separately, Column 2 reports 
the results when using the log of future donations (LnFutureDonations) as the dependent 
variable.  The coefficient on CEOTotalComp/TE is negative and highly significant.  Nonprofit 
organizations with higher CEO compensation as a percentage of total expenses have lower future 
donations.  Column 3 reports the results when using the log of future grants (LnFutureGrants) as 
the dependent variable.  Again, the coefficient on CEOTotalComp/TE is negative and highly 
significant.  These results show that nonprofit organizations with a higher percentage of total 
expenses spent on CEO compensation also have lower future grants.  The results reported in 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 provide strong, consistent support for H1.  The results show that donors and 
grantors react to CEO compensation levels and that organizations with a higher percentage of 
expenses spent on CEO compensation receive less in future funding compared to organizations 
with a lower percentage of expenses spent on CEO compensation. 
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[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Types of CEO Compensation 
 H2 predicts that donors and grantors will react negatively to the different types of CEO 
compensation.  Table 6 presents the results from regressing the log of future total contributions, 
the log of future donations, and the log of future grants on the types of CEO compensation and 
controls.  Column 1 reports the results when using the log of future total contributions 
(LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable.  The coefficients on 
CEOBaseComp/TE, CEOOtherComp/TE, and CEONontaxableBenefits/TE are negative and 
significant.  This indicates that future contributions are sensitive to amounts spent on CEO base 
compensation, other compensation, and nontaxable benefits. 
Examining the main components of future contributions, I find that donors and grantors 
differ in their reactions to the types of CEO compensation.  Column 2 reports the results when 
using the log of future donations (LnFutureDonations) as the dependent variable.  Column 2 
shows that out of the independent variables of interest, only the coefficient on 
CEOBaseComp/TE is negative and significant.  Donors react negatively when organizations 
spend a higher percentage of total expenses on CEO base compensation.  Column 3 reports the 
results when using the log of future grants (LnFutureGrants) as the dependent variable.  Column 
3 shows that the coefficients on CEOBaseComp/TE, CEOOtherComp/TE, and 
CEONontaxableBenefits/TE are all negative and significant.  Grantors react negatively when 
organizations spend a higher percentage of total expenses on CEO base compensation, other 
compensation, and nontaxable benefits.   
 While both donors and grantors react negatively to the ratio of total CEO compensation 
to total expenses, their reactions to the types of compensation are different.  Donors react only to 
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the base compensation of CEOs.  Grantors react to base compensation plus other compensation 
and nontaxable benefits.  One explanation for this is that donors do not pay attention to the types 
of CEO compensation but instead focus only on total CEO compensation.  Table 4 shows that 
the correlation between total CEO compensation scaled by total expenses is very highly 
correlated with CEO base compensation scaled by total expenses (.967).  Because of this, it is 
possible that CEO base compensation acts as a proxy for total CEO compensation for the 
donations regression.  In contrast, grantors appear to pay attention to the types of CEO 
compensation and are particularly sensitive to high levels of base compensation, other 
compensation, and nontaxable benefits and penalize organizations with higher amount of these 
with lower grants.  Because grants are often applied for by organizations, grantors may pay more 
careful attention to CEO compensation disclosures as part of that application process. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Donor and Grantor Sophistication 
 H3 predicts that the negative relation between contributions and CEO compensation will 
be even stronger when an organization has sophisticated donors and grantors.  Table 7 presents 
the results from regressing the log of future total contributions, the log of future donations, and 
the log of future grants on total CEO compensation, a measure of donor and grantor 
sophistication, their interaction, and control variables.  HaveRestrictedNA is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the organization has temporary or permanently restricted net assets.  In contrast, 
RestrictedNAOverMed is a dummy variable that captures not only if a nonprofit organization has 
restricted net assets but also whether the percentage of their net assets classified as restricted is 
large compared to the sample. 
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Columns 1 and 2 report the results when using the log of future total contributions 
(LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable.  In Column 1, the coefficient on the 
interaction, CEOTotalComp/TE*HaveRestrictedNA, is negative and significant.  Similarly, in 
Column 2, the coefficient on the interaction, CEOTotalComp/TE*RestrictedNAOverMed, is 
negative and significant.  These results indicate that the negative reaction of donors and grantors 
to the amount spent on CEO compensation is even stronger (i.e. more negative) in organizations 
with sophisticated donors and grantors.   
When I split future contributions into its major components, I find consistent results that 
donor and grantor sophistication matters.  Columns 3 and 4 report the results when using the log 
of future donations (LnFutureDonations) as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on 
CEOTotalComp/TE is not significant in either column but the coefficient on the interaction in 
both columns is negative and significant.  This indicates for donors at least, the reaction to CEO 
compensation only occurs in organizations with sophisticated donors.  This may occur because 
donors that place restrictions on their donations engage in more monitoring of the organization 
and may be more likely to pay attention to CEO compensation levels where smaller donors 
would not have the same incentive. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results when using the log of future grants (LnFutureGrants) 
as the dependent variable.  The interaction is negative and significant in both columns.  Again, I 
find support for H3.  The negative relation between future grants and CEO compensation is 
stronger in the presence of sophisticated donors and grantors.  CEOTotalComp/TE is not 
significant in column 5 but is negative and significant in column 6.  This result indicates that 
grants are sensitive to CEO compensation in organizations with any amount of restricted net 
assets, not just those with higher levels. 
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
CEO on the Board 
 H4 predicts that the negative relation between contributions and CEO compensation will 
be even stronger when the CEO serves on the board of directors.  Table 8 presents the results of 
Equation 4.  Column 1 reports the results from using LnFutureTotalDonations as the dependent 
variable.  Column 2 reports the results from using LnFutureDonations as the dependent variable 
and Column 3 reports the results from using LnFutureGrants.  Using any of the three dependent 
variables, I do not find significance on the interaction between CEO compensation and the 
dummy variable for whether the CEO serves on the board of directors.  The coefficient on 
CEOTotalComp/TE is negative and significant in all three columns.  These results suggest that it 
does not matter if the CEO is on the board.  The negative reaction by donors and grants to CEO 
compensation is not any stronger when the CEO is a director.   
 One possible explanation for these results is that just serving on the board is not an 
indication of agency costs.  It may be that an increased role on the board of directors such as 
serving as chairman is what may signal increased agency costs.  In the for-profit literature, 
serving as the chairman of the board is the measure used to capture the CEO’s influence on the 
board (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Cyert et al. 2002, Goyal and Park 2002, Grinstein and Hribar 2004). 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent me from testing this alternative explanation with my 
sample. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Source of Revenue 
 H5 predicts that the negative relation between contributions and CEO compensation will 
be even stronger when the organization is reliant on contributions as a source of revenue.  Table 
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9, Panel A presents the results of Equation 5.  Columns 1 through 3 report the results from using 
LnFutureTotalDonations as the dependent variable.  The interaction between 
CEOTotalComp/TE and each dummy variable for the percentage of revenue that comes from 
contributions is negative and highly significant across all three columns.  Donors and grantors 
have a stronger negative reaction to CEO compensation when 75%, 50%, and even 25% of the 
organization’s revenue comes from contributions.  These results provide support for H5.   
Columns 4 through 6 report the results when LnFutureDonations is the dependent 
variable and Columns 7 through 9 report the results when using LnFutureGrants.  These results 
are consistent with the results reported for total contributions.  Both donations and grants are 
separately more sensitive to CEO compensation in organizations that are more reliant on 
contributions as a source of revenue.  This is true for organizations where a majority of revenue 
comes from contributions as well as organizations where only 25% of revenue comes from 
contributions.   
 Given the results reported in Panel A, where the interactions between CEOTotalComp/TE 
and 25%, 50%, and 75% reliant on contributions are all significant, I examine whether there is a 
difference in reaction to CEO compensation between these levels.  I begin by creating new 
dummy variables.  ContriBetween25-50% is equal to one for observations where contributions 
account for 25 to 49% of revenue.27  Similarly, ContriBetween50-75% is equal to one for 
observations where contributions account for 50 to 74% of total revenue and ContriBetween75-
100% is equal to one for observations where contributions account for 75% or greater of total 
revenue.  Modifying Equation 5, I include all three dummy variables and interact each one with 
CEOTotalComp/TE.  The results are reported in Table 9, Panel B.  Column 1 reports the results 
                                                 
27 Similar to the percentage of revenue calculation used for Panel A, the denominator for these 
calculations excludes investment income and other revenue. 
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when using future contributions (LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable and 
shows that the coefficients on all three interactions are negative and highly significant which is 
consistent with the results reported in Panel A.  Because the variables are now all in the same 
model, I can test the differences between contribution reliance.  An F-test comparing 
CEOTotalComp/TE*ContriBetween25-50% and CEOTotalComp/TE*ContriBetween50-75% is 
statistically significant (p-value .052).  The same is true when comparing 
CEOTotalComp/TE*ContriBetween25-50% and CEOTotalComp/TE*Contri>75% (p-value 
.063).  However, the difference between CEOTotalComp/TE*ContriBetween50-75% and 
CEOTotalComp/TE*Contri>75% is not statistically significant.  These results show a stronger 
negative reaction to CEO compensation for nonprofit organizations that receive a majority of 
their revenue (greater than 50%) in the form of contributions compared to organizations where 
contributions account for 25 to 50% of revenue.  This result provides further support for H5.   
 Column 2 reports the result from using future donations (LnFutureDonations) as the 
dependent variable and Column 3 reports the results using future grants (LnFutureGrants).  All 
of the interactions are negative and statistically significant in both columns, consistent with the 
results reported in Panel A.  F-tests examining the differences between interactions are generally 
not significant however.  The difference in results as compared to Column 1 may be due to using 
total contributions as a percentage of revenue to create dummy variables instead of using 
donations or grants as a percentage of revenue for these separate regressions.   
 H6 predicts that the relation between future contributions and the percentage of expenses 
spent on CEO compensation is affected by the reliance on grants and donations as a source of 
contributions.  The results of estimating Equation 6 are reported in Table 9, Panel C.  I estimate 
Equation 6 for four separate samples.  Column 1 reports results for observations with less than 
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25% of revenue from contributions in t.  These are nonprofit organizations least reliant on 
contributions as a source of revenue.  Observations included in Column 2 (Column 3) have 
between 25-49% (50-74%) of revenue from contributions in t.  Finally, Column 4 reports results 
for the organizations most reliant on contributions as a source of revenue, those with 75% or 
greater revenue from contributions in t.  In all columns, the dependent variable is future total 
contributions (LnFutureTotalContributions).  The interaction, 
CEOTotalComp/TE*Grants>Donations, is only significant in Column 4.  These results indicate 
that for organizations most reliant on contributions as a source of revenue (i.e. with a reliance 
greater or equal to 75%), the negative reaction to the percentage of expenses spent on CEO 
compensation is stronger (i.e. more negative) when an organization is more reliant on grants 
versus donations.  This result provides some support for H6 for organizations heavily reliant on 
contributions. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
CEO Salary Allocation 
 H7 predicts that donor and grantor reaction to CEO compensation will be more negative 
if none of the CEO’s compensation is allocated to program related expenses.  Table 10 presents 
the results of Equation 7.  Columns 1 and 2 report the results from using future total 
contributions (LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable.  Columns 3 and 4 report 
the results from using future donations (LnFutureDonations) as the dependent variable and 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results using future grants (LnFutureGrants).  Columns 1, 3, and 5 
report results excluding the interaction term while Columns 2, 4, and 6 include the interaction.  
Across Columns 2, 4, and 6, the coefficient on the interaction, 
CEOTotalComp/TE*OfficerCompAllM&F, is not significant.  These results indicate that donor 
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and grantor reaction to CEO compensation is not affected by how CEO compensation is 
allocated on the 990, results that do not support H7. 
 I report the results without the interaction term in Columns 1, 3, and 5 to show donor and 
grantor reaction when organizations allocate all officer compensation to management and 
general.  Across all three columns, I find a significant, negative coefficient on 
OfficerCompAllM&F.  These results indicate that nonprofit organizations with officers that have 
none of their compensation allocated towards program related activities receive less in 
contributions, donations, and grants.  While this is not directly related to H7, these results are 
indirectly related in that they show donors and grantors seem to care about the overall allocation 
of officer compensation expense.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Robustness Tests 
 To help assure that my results are not due to systematic patterns in grants and donations 
and the percentage of expenses spent on CEO compensation across nonprofit industry types, I 
calculate a measure of industry adjusted CEO compensation.  To do this, I calculate the median 
total CEO compensation scaled by total expenses per industry-year.  I then calculate the industry 
adjusted CEO compensation (IndAdjCEOTotalComp/TE) by subtracting the median industry-
year ratio from each observation.  I do a similar calculation for the types of CEO compensation.  
I re-estimate Equations 1 and 2 using this industry adjusted measure.  The results are reported in 
Table 11. 
 Columns 1 and 2 report the results using the log of total future contributions 
(LnFutureTotalContributions) as the dependent variable.  Columns 3 and 4 report the results 
using the log of future donations (LnFutureDonations) as the dependent variable.  Columns 5 
41 
 
and 6 report the results using the log of future grants (LnFutureGrants) as the dependent 
variable.  Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results of Equation 1 and Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the 
results of Equation 2.  Future contributions, future donations, and future grants are negatively 
related to industry adjusted total CEO compensation scaled by total expenses.  Future donations 
are negatively related to industry adjusted scaled CEO base compensation scaled by total 
expenses and future grants are negatively related to industry adjusted scaled CEO base 
compensation, other compensation, and nontaxable benefits.  The results are consistent with 
those reported in Tables 5 and 6.   
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 Additional Tests  
Besides funding from donors and grantors, some nonprofit organizations receive indirect 
public support through donations from federated agencies.  This amount is included in total 
contributions.28  These federated agencies are fundraising organizations that raise money through 
fundraising campaigns specifically to distribute to other organizations.  The United Way is an 
example of this type of organization.  To determine if federated campaign income is sensitive to 
CEO compensation, I re-estimate Equations 1 and 2 using the log of future federated campaign 
income (LnFutureFederatedCampaign) as the dependent variable.  Some funds raised during a 
federated campaign may be designated by the donor while other funds raised may be distributed 
at the discretion of the federated agency so the monitoring role related to this type of funding is 
unclear.   
                                                 
28 I do not report the results of federated campaigns along with my main tests because compared 




 Table 12 reports the results from regressing future federated campaign income on CEO 
compensation variables and controls.29  The results are not similar to the results found when 
using future donations or future grants as the dependent variable.  Future federated campaign 
income is not negatively related to the ratio of total CEO compensation to total expenses 
(Column 1).  Examining the reaction to types of compensation (Column 2), future federated 
campaign income is only negatively related to scaled CEO incentive compensation.  Federated 
agencies appear to penalize nonprofit organizations with less funding if they spend a higher 
percentage of expenses on incentive compensation for the CEO.   
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 This study examines whether nonprofit organizations that spend a higher percentage of 
expenses on CEO compensation receive less in donations and grants compared to nonprofit 
organizations that spend a lower percentage.  Given the potential agency problems in nonprofit 
organizations, I predict that donors and grantors will penalize organizations that spend a high 
percentage of expenses on CEO compensation.  My results provide support for this hypothesis 
and suggest that donations and grants are lower for organizations that spend a higher percentage 
of total expenses on CEO compensation.  Future contributions, donations, and grants are all 
negatively related to the percentage of expenses spent on CEO compensation.   
 In additional tests, I examine how donors and grantors respond to the types of CEO 
compensation.  I find that donors and grantors give less to organizations that spend a high 
                                                 
29 The sample size drops considerably because I limit my sample to organizations that report at 
least one thousand dollars of federated campaign income and not all nonprofit organizations 
receive this type of funding. 
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percentage of expenses on the CEO’s base compensation.  Grantors also react negatively to the 
percentage of expenses spent on other CEO compensation and nontaxable benefits.  These results 
indicate that grantors are more sensitive to different types of CEO compensation than donors. 
Given the results of my main tests, I examine situations where the reaction of donors and 
grantors may be even stronger.  Using the presence of and level of restricted net assets to proxy 
for donor and grantor sophistication, I find strong evidence that the negative reaction of donors 
and grantors is stronger when organizations have more sophisticated donors and grantors.  I also 
find that the relation between future contributions and CEO compensation is stronger in 
organizations that are more reliant on contributions as a source of revenue.  I do not find any 
evidence that the reporting of CEO compensation expense as program related, management, or 
fundraising has any effect on how donors and grantors respond to the percentage of expenses 
spent on CEO compensation.  I also do not find that the CEO serving on the board of directors 
changes how donors and grantors respond to CEO compensation.  
 This study does not attempt to determine if the compensation earned by CEOs of 
nonprofit organizations is reasonable or not.  Instead, given the amount that nonprofit 
organizations spend on CEO compensation, whether reasonable or unreasonable, I examine how 
donors and grantors react to this amount.  I find consistent evidence that contributions are 
negatively affected by CEO compensation.  The results of this study suggest that boards of 
directors of nonprofit organizations, especially those that rely heavily on donations and grants to 
accomplish their mission, should carefully consider the potential consequences to an 
organization when setting and negotiating CEO compensation and its specific characteristics.  
While numerous articles suggest that nonprofit stakeholders are concerned about the level of 
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CEO compensation in nonprofit organizations, the results of this study find empirical evidence 
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LnFutureTotalContributions Natural log of (1 + total donations + total government grants + total federated campaigns).  
From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1f, 1e, and 1a. 
LnFutureDonations Natural log of (1 + total donations).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1f. 
LnFutureGovtGrants Natural log of (1 + government grants).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1e. 
LnFutureFederatedCampaign Natural log of (1 + federated campaigns).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1a. 
CEOTotalComp/TE Total CEO compensation scaled by total expenses.  Total CEO compensation from Form 990, 
Schedule J, Part II, Column E.  Total expenses from Form 990, Part IX, Column A, Line 25. 
CEOBaseComp/TE Total CEO base compensation scaled by total expenses.  Total CEO base compensation from 
Form 990, Schedule J, Part II, Column B(i).  Total expenses from Form 990, Part IX, Column 
A, Line 25. 
CEOIncentiveComp/TE Total CEO incentive compensation scaled by total expenses.  Total CEO incentive 
compensation from Form 990, Schedule J, Part II, Column B(ii).  Total expenses from Form 
990, Part IX, Column A, Line 25. 
CEOOtherComp/TE Total CEO other compensation scaled by total expenses.  Total CEO other compensation from 
Form 990, Schedule J, Part II, Column B(iii).  Total expenses from Form 990, Part IX, 
Column A, Line 25. 
CEODeferredComp/TE Total CEO deferred compensation scaled by total expenses.  Total CEO deferred 
compensation from Form 990, Schedule J, Part II, Column C.  Total expenses from Form 990, 
Part IX, Column A, Line 25. 
CEONontaxableBenefits/TE Total CEO nontaxable benefits scaled by total expenses.  Total CEO nontaxable benefits from 
Form 990, Schedule J, Part II, Column D.  Total expenses from Form 990, Part IX, Column A, 
Line 25. 
ProgramExpRatio Total program service expenses scaled by total expenses.  Total program expenses from Form 
990, Part IX, Column B, Line 25.  Total expenses from Form 990, Part IX, Column A, Line 
25. 







LnAge Natural log of (1 + the organization's age).  From Form 990, Block L. 
LnTotalAssets Natural log of (1 + total assets).  From Form 990, Part X, Column B, Line 16. 
LnGovtGrants Natural log of (1 + government grants).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1e. 
LnProgramServRev Natural log of (1 + program service revenue).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Column A, Line 2g. 
LnFederatedCampaigns Natural log of (1 + federated campaigns).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1a. 
LnDonations Natural log of (1 + total donations).  From Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1f. 
HaveRestrictedNA Dummy variable equal to 1 if Form 990, Part X Line 28 or 29 indicates the organization has 
temporarily or permanently restricted net assets, 0 otherwise. 
RestrictedNAOverMed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization has temporarily or permanently restricted net 
assets greater than the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
CEOIsDirector Dummy variable equal to 1 if Form 990, Part VII, Section A indicates the CEO is a director on 
the board, 0 otherwise. 
Contri>25% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization receives more than 25% of its total 
contributions (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1h) and program service revenue (Form 990, Part 
VIII, Line 2g) are in total contributions, 0 otherwise. 
Contri>50% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization receives more than 50% of its total 
contributions (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1h) and program service revenue (Form 990, Part 
VIII, Line 2g) in total contributions, 0 otherwise. 
Contri>75% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization receives more than 75% of its total 
contributions (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1h) and program service revenue (Form 990, Part 
VIII, Line 2g) in total contributions, 0 otherwise. 
ContriBetween25-50% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization receives 25% or greater but less than 50% of its 
total contributions (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1h) and program service revenue (Form 990, 
Part VIII, Line 2g) in total contributions, 0 otherwise. 
ContriBetween50-75% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization receives 50% or greater but less than 75% of its 
total contributions (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1h) and program service revenue (Form 990, 







ContriBetween75-100% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization receives 75% or greater of its total contributions 
(Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1h) and program service revenue (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 2g) in 
total contributions, 0 otherwise. 
Grants>Donations Dummy variable equal to 1 if grant revenue (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1e) is greater than 
donation revenue (Form 990, Part VIII, Line 1f). 
OfficerCompAllM&F Dummy variable equal to 1 if Form 990, Part IX indicates that none of the compensation of 
current officers, directors, trustees, and key employees is allocated to program service 
expenses, 0 otherwise. 
IndAdjCEOTotalComp/TE CEOTotalComp/TE minus the median CEOTotalComp/TE calculated for each industry and 
year. 
IndAdjCEOBaseComp/TE CEOBaseComp/TE minus the median CEOBaseComp/TE calculated for each industry and 
year. 
IndAdjCEOIncentiveComp/TE CEOIncentiveComp/TE minus the median CEOIncentiveComp/TE calculated for each 
industry and year. 
IndAdjCEOOtherComp/TE CEOOtherComp/TE minus the median CEOOtherComp/TE calculated for each industry and 
year. 
IndAdjCEODeferredComp/TE CEODeferredComp/TE minus the median CEODeferredComp/TE calculated for each industry 
and year. 
IndAdjCEONontaxableBenefits/TE CEONontaxableBenefits/TE minus the median CEONontaxableBenefits/TE calculated for 
each industry and year. 
 
  












Donations  Grants 
Panel A: Sample Reconciliation 
   All 2008 & 2009 501(c)(3) organizations in IRS   
microdata file         29,767     29,767  
   
29,767  
Less observations:  
   Where schedule J is not filed        (11,219)  (11,219) (11,219) 
Where the CEO could not reasonably be  
determined          (8,199)    (8,199) 
    
(8,199) 
Where zero or negative CEO compensation is  
reported               (17)         (17) 
         
(17) 
Missing control variables             (175)       (175)      (175) 
Where dependent variable is missing or less  
than $1,000          (1,547)    (1,983) 
    
(4,975) 
Final sample           8,610       8,174      5,182  
    
    Panel B: Distribution by NTEE Category 
   Arts, Culture, and Humanities              602          597  470 
Education           2,639       2,608  1691 
Environment and Animals              211          207  144 
Foreign Affairs              187          181  124 
Health           2,715       2,419  1710 
Human Services           1,463       1,423  698 
Mutual/Membership Benefit                  2              2  2 
Public, Societal Benefit              727          673  342 
Religion Related                64            64  1 








Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Median 
FutureTotalContributions 
     
8,610  
     
18,371,291  





     
8,174  
     
10,318,240  





     
5,182  
     
11,600,569  





        
915  
          
460,164  
          
583,103  144,984  
CEOTotalComp 
     
8,610  
          
422,242  
          
373,953  
     
303,972  
CEOBaseComp 
     
8,610  
          
287,467  
          
158,763  
     
242,248  
CEOIncentiveComp 
     
8,610  
            
32,680  
            
84,548  0  
CEOOtherComp 
     
8,610  
            
37,023  
          
117,803  
            
516  
CEODeferredComp 
     
8,610  
            
34,321  
            
73,194  
       
12,837  
CEONontaxableBenefits 
     
8,610  
            
19,910  
            
21,635  
       
14,116  
CEOTotalComp/TE 
     
8,610  0.0155 0.0220 0.0084 
CEOBaseComp/TE 
     
8,610  0.0121 0.0173 0.0064 
CEOIncentiveComp/TE 
     
8,610  0.0006 0.0019 0.0000 
CEOOtherComp/TE 
     
8,610  0.0006 0.0018 0.0000 
CEODeferredComp/TE 
     
8,610  0.0008 0.0018 0.0002 
CEONontaxableBenefits/TE 
     
8,610  0.0009 0.0016 0.0003 
ProgramExpRatio 
     
8,610  0.8237 0.1035 0.8423 
LnFundraisingExp 
     
8,610  9.6939 6.1722 12.8982 
LnAge 
     
8,610  3.9213 0.8234 4.0254 
LnTotalAssets 
     
8,610  18.2431 1.3577 18.2045 
LnGovtGrants 
     





     
8,610  15.1784 5.3311 16.8500 
LnFederatedCampaigns 
     
8,610  1.2586 3.6895 0.0000 
LnDonations 
     
8,610  13.4409 4.0890 14.4909 
CEOIsDirector 
     
8,610  0.3434 0.4749 0.0000 
  
    Definitions of the variables reported in this table are provided in Appendix B. 







Schedule J Descriptives 
 
PANEL A: Occurrence of types of CEO Compensation 
Types of Compensation 
% of observations 
reporting a CEO 






  PANEL B: Method Used for Establishing the Compensation of the CEO 
Method Used % of observations 
Compensation committee 64.1% 
Independent compensation consultant 37.7% 
Form 990 of other organizations 31.7% 
Written employment contract 52.9% 
Compensation survey or study 75.9% 
Approval by the board or compensation committee 91.9% 








  Average # of Methods Used                       3.54 
  PANEL C: Occurrence of Contingent Compensation in Organization 
Executive received compensation contingent on 
revenues of organization or related organization 3.9% 
Executive received compensation contingent on net 
earnings of organization or related organization 4.9% 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 LnFutureTotalContributions 1.0000 
        
           
           2 LnFutureDonations 0.5645 1.0000 
       
  
0.0000 
        
           3 LnFutureGovtGrants 0.4271 0.1779 1.0000 
      
  
0.0000 0.0000 
       
           4 CEOTotalComp/TE -0.1670 -0.1243 -0.1824 1.0000 
     
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
           5 CEOBaseComp/TE -0.1656 -0.1245 -0.1836 0.9665 1.0000 
    
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
           6 CEOIncentiveComp/TE -0.0880 -0.0780 -0.0592 0.3495 0.2417 1.0000 
   
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    
           7 CEOOtherComp/TE -0.0499 -0.0321 -0.0550 0.2851 0.1538 0.1431 1.0000 
  
  
0.0000 0.0037 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   
           8 CEODeferredComp/TE -0.0706 -0.0347 -0.0982 0.4938 0.4031 0.2133 0.1786 1.0000 
 
  
0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
           9 CEONontaxableBenefits/TE -0.1110 -0.0635 -0.1380 0.6190 0.8934 0.1387 0.0521 0.2863 1.0000 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 














TotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   






























































































































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are 
one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a directional prediction.  Industries dummies 
are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 














TotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   

















































































































































































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are 
one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a directional prediction.  Industries dummies 
are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 















TotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   


































HaveRestrictedNA + 0.126 













   












































   
(0.009) 
 



































LnAge ? -0.096 *** -0.122 *** -0.018 
 




































































































   
 
      




   
 
      

















   
 
























































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a 
directional prediction.  Industries dummies are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 














TotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   






















































































































































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are 
one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a directional prediction.  Industries dummies 
are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 








The Effect of Reliance on Contributions on Donor and Grantor Reaction to CEO Compensation 
 




LnFutureTotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Pred. 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   























































Contri>25% + 1.827 *** 
    
0.925 *** 
    
1.494 *** 





    
(0.000) 
 
    
(0.000) 
     
CEOTotalComp/TE 
     *Contri>25% - 
-10.554 *** 
    
-6.801 *** 
    
-10.237 ** 





    
(0.000) 
 
    
(0.023) 




    
0.882 *** 







    
 
(0.000) 
     
(0.000) 
   
CEOTotalComp/TE 
     *Contri>50% -   
-14.976 *** 
    
-6.232 *** 







    
 
(0.000) 
     
(0.001) 
   
Contri>75% + 
    
1.715 *** 
    
0.900 *** 















     *Contri>75% -     
-14.433 *** 
    
-6.536 *** 











     
(0.013) 
 






























































































































LnProgramServRev ? -0.027 *** -0.018 *** -0.016 *** -0.025 *** -0.020 *** -0.015 *** 0.003 
 
0.016 * 0.020 ** 
 
I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a 
directional prediction.  Industries dummies are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 












TotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   











































































































































































    


















Test of Differences in Interaction Terms (2-tailed) 
 
 
    


























































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are 







are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 














Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   




















































































LnAge ? 0.008 
 





















































































































Column 1 reports results for observations with less than 25% of revenue from contributions in t.  Column 2 reports results for 
observations with 25-49% of revenue from contributions in t.  Column 3 reports results for observations with 50-74% of revenue from 
contributions in t.  Finally, Column 4 reports results for observations with 75% or greater revenue from contributions in t.  I estimate 
each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Robust p-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are one-tailed for 
coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a directional prediction.  Industries dummies are included by 














LnFutureTotalContributions LnFutureDonations LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   












































   
7.400 
   
2.647 
 






































































































































































































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a 
directional prediction.  Industries dummies are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 













DV = LnFutureDonations DV = LnFutureDonations DV = LnFutureGrants 
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   

















































   
-10.614 

































   
-4.292 


















   
-37.781 * 






   
(0.075) 
 













































































































































   
 






















































I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a 
directional prediction.  Industries dummies are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a 














Sign (1)   (2)   












































   
(0.268) 
 
































































    
      
      

























I estimate each model using OLS.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Robust p-values (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at organization-level.  P-values are one-tailed for 
coefficients with a directional prediction and two-tailed for those without a directional 
prediction.  Industries dummies are included by NTEE category.  All continuous variables have 
been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  See Appendix B for a detailed definition of variables. 
 
